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REGULATION OF FRANCHISOR 
OPPORTUNISM AND PRODUCTION OF THE 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: FEDERAL 
MONOPOLY OR COMPETITION BETWEEN 
THE STATES? 
ALAN J. MEESE* 
Most scholars would agree that a merger between General 
Motors and Ford should not be judged solely by Delaware 
corporate law, even if both firms are incorporated in Delaware. 
Leaving the standards governing such mergers to state law 
would assuredly produce a race to the bottom that would 
result in unduly permissive treatment of such transactions.! 
Similarly, if the two firms agreed to divide markets, most 
would agree that some regulatory authority other than 
Michigan or Delaware should have the final word on the 
agreement.2 Thus, in order to forestall monopoly or its 
equivalent, the national government must itself exercise a 
monopoly-currently through the Sherman Act-over the 
production of rules governing such transactions.3 
This is not to say that the national government should 
exercise a monopoly with respect to all commercial 
transactions with some interstate nexus. Assume, for instance, 
• Associate Professor of Law and Fellow, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, William and 
Mary School of Law. J.D., The University of Chicago; A.B., The College of William and 
Mary. Conversations with Peter Alces and Charles Koch provided guidance on this 
project. The William and Mary School of Law provided a summer research grant in 
support of this project. This essay is a revised version of oral remarks presented at the 
Federalist Society Eighteenth Annual Student Symposium at The University of Chicago 
Law School on April9-10, 1999. 
1. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937 257-60 
(1991); Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1929, 49 J. 
ECON. HIST. 677 (1989). 
2 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 
23 (1983). 
3. See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 343-47 (1904) (rejecting 
assertion that merger between two interstate railroads should be governed solely by 
state law); see also United States v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61, 86 (1912) 
(holding that legality under state law is no defense against Sherman Act liability). 
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that a contractor from North Carolina promises to build an 
addition to my house in Virginia before the winter and 
completes ninety percent of the project-all except the roof- by 
November 15. Assume further that the contractor threatens not 
to complete the project, knowing that I cannot find satisfactory 
substitute performance, and thus secures my "agreement" to 
an increase in the contract price. Most scholars would agree 
that state contract law should govern my claims for relief, and 
that competition between the states regarding the standards 
governing such conduct would not result in a race to the 
bottom.4 Therefore, no federal monopoly is necessary. 
This essay examines a class of cases that stands somewhere 
between the merger of Ford and General Motors, on the one 
hand, and the threatened breach by the contractor on the other: 
franchisor opportunism. These cases are similar to the 
hypothetical merger or cartel involving Ford and General 
Motors in that the "offending" parties are large, often 
multinational corporations that do business in all fifty states. 
However, they are also like the threatened breach by the 
contractor in that they involve opportunism in two-party, 
buyer-seller relationships, opportunism that seems redressable 
under traditional contract law doctrines. The hybrid nature of 
such cases presents a puzzle for courts and policymakers who 
must decide which institution-federal monopoly or 
competition between the states-should generate the rules 
governing these transactions. 
This essay suggests that the federal government should not, 
under the aegis of the Sherman Act, displace competition 
among the states for the production of rules governing 
purported franchisor opportunism. As shown below, the case 
for Sherman Act intervention to combat franchisor 
opportunism turns on the existence of transaction costs, costs 
4. See Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 103 (9th Cir. 1902) (holding that 
a new "agreement" obtained by threatened breach was unenforceable given pre-
existing duty rule); see also Industrial Representatives, Inc. v. CP Clare Corp., 74 F.3d 
128, 129-30 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that implied covenant of good faith is designed to 
combat opportunism, giving as an example "[t]he movie star who sulks (in the hope of 
being offered more money) when production is 90% complete, and reshooting the 
picture without him would be exceedingly expensive"). Indeed, one of the most 
committed proponents of using the Sherman Act to combat opportunism would not 
stretch the Act to reach the contractor's conduct. See WarrenS. Grimes, Making Sense of 
State Oil Co. v. Khan: Vertical Maximum Price Fixing Under a Rule of Reason, 66 
ANTITRUST L.J. 567, 594 (1998) [hereinafter Vertical Maximum Price Fixing]. 
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that would prevent franchisees from protecting themselves in 
advance by contract or exit. Indeed, the treble-damage remedy 
of the Sherman Act can be characterized as a liability rule that 
obviates the market failure that transaction costs would 
otherwise engender. 
Those who have advocated Sherman Act regulation in this 
context have treated transaction costs as a given-exogenous to 
the legal system. However, as shown below, these costs are in 
fact a function of the institutional framework, which is 
constructed in part by various rules of contract law. By 
adjusting these common law rules by judicial decision or 
statute, states can alter the institutional framework, reduce the 
cost of transactions, and thus undermine the case for Sherman 
Act intervention. 
The mere fact that state courts and legislatures could generate 
rules that deter franchisor opportunism does not mean that 
they will. Delaware, after all, could produce corporate law that 
deterred all wealth-destroying mergers, though one doubts it 
would do so.s Still, given state law's potential for preventing 
franchisor opportunism, advocates of federal intervention in 
this area must demonstrate that competition between states to 
produce the institutional framework governing such behavior 
is beset by a market failure that will produce a race to the 
bottom. No such demonstration has been made, and 
preliminary analysis suggests that competition between the 
states will not, in fact, produce a race to the bottom in this 
context. 
I. THE CASE FOR SHERMAN Acr INTERVENTION 
Opportunism by franchisors can take several forms, and 
consideration of a concrete example that may raise antitrust 
concerns will help focus the analysis.6 Assume that PizzaShack, 
a multinational franchisor with outlets in fifty states, enters a 
standard form franchise contract with hundreds of franchisees. 
Page 11 of the contract, paragraph 63, provides that PizzaShack 
can require its franchisees to purchase inputs from it at 
5. See infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
6. The ensuing example follows the lead of Professor Grimes. See Warren Grimes, 
When Do Franchisors Have Market Power? Antitrust Remedies for Franchisor Opportunism, 
65 ANTITRUsr L.J. 105, 142-48 (1996) [hereinafter Franchisors and Market Power]. 
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"PizzaShack' s discretion."7 Further, the contract is silent 
regarding PizzaShack' s right to control its franchisees' prices 
and to appoint other franchisees near the location of an 
established outlet. The contract is governed by a ten-year term, 
and may be terminated "at will" by either party upon thirty 
days written notice. 
Some time after entering into these contracts with its 
franchisees, PizzaShack invokes its rights under paragraph 63, 
and announces that, henceforth, all outlets will purchase pizza 
sauce and dough only from it.s At the same time, the firm 
announces a new II consumer friendly price policy/' which will 
require many franchisees to roll back their prices on some 
iterns.9 Failure to adhere to either policy, PizzaShack asserts, 
will result in termination. Finally, PizzaShack embarks on an 
aggressive expansion plan, which involves the appointment of 
new franchisees that II encroach" upon areas previously served 
by existing outlets.1o 
Encouraged by the Supreme Court's decision in Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., n some scholars, 
judges, and numerous franchisees would characterize 
PizzaShack' s strategy as a classic example of franchisor 
opportunism, opportunism that should be presumed unlawful 
under the Sherman Act.12 Consider first paragraph 63-the 
7. See Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430,433 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(describing clause providing that Domino's "may in our sole discretion require that 
ingredients, supplies and materials used in the preparation, packaging, and delivery of 
pizza be purchased exclusively from us or from approved suppliers or distributors"); 
Wilson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 984 F. Supp. 450, 452-53 (E.D. La. 1997) (describing 
requirement that franchisees of SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. purchase oil from 
Mobil Oil Corporation). 
8. See Queen City Pizza, 124 F.3d at 434 (describing allegations of similar conduct by 
Domino's); Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. Smith, 895 F. Supp. 884, 887-88 (E.D. Mich. 
1995) (describing similar allegations by Little Caesar franchisees). 
9. See Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 706-08 (7th Cir. 
1984) (recounting claim that manufacturer imposed maximum resale prices on its 
dealers); Little Caesar, 895 F. Supp. at 888-89 (recounting allegation that Little Caesar 
attempted to place ceiling on franchisees' prices, without contractual basis). 
10. See Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 727-28 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(describing allegations that Fotomat "encroached" on franchisee's territory by placing 
company stores in franchisee's market areas). 
11. 504 u.s. 451 (1992). 
12 See Grimes, Franchisors and Market Power, supra note 6, at 122-23; Jean Wegman 
Burns, Vertical Restraints, Efficiency, and the Real World, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 637-39, 
648-49 (1993) (endorsing application of Eastman Kodak in dealership context); Robert H. 
Lande, Chicago Takes it on the Chin: Imperfect Information Could Play a Crucial Role in the 
Post-Kodak World, 62 ANTITRUsr L.J. 193, 200 (1993) (predicting that Eastman Kodak 
could apply in franchising context). See generally W. David Slawson, Excluding 
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tying contract. To be sure, it is highly unlikely that PizzaShack 
has any 11market power11 in a market for franchise 
opportunities.13 Thus, PizzaShack did not, at the time of 
contract formation, have the ability to II force11 franchisees to 
accept unwanted terrns.14 Still, by the time the new policy was 
announced, PizzaShack' s franchisees were likely 11locked in11 to 
their relationships (i.e., they had made investments specific to 
their status as PizzaShack franchisees).15 At this point, 
PizzaShack is in a position to exercise a sort of 11market power11 
vis a vis its franchisees, by, for instance, enforcing or imposing 
onerous contractual terrns.16 To be sure, the clause 
11 authorizing~~ the new policy appeared in the contract from its 
inception; franchisees thus had notice of it and could have 
bargained for its removal or modification before PizzaShack 
had them over a barrel. Still, most franchisees probably did not 
read the clause, or if they did, decided not to invest resources 
bargaining over itP Thus, it is said, courts should presume the 
tie unlawful, subject to the assertion of an affirmative defense.1s 
Competition Without Monopoly Power: The Use Of Tying Arrangements To Exploit Market 
Failure, 36 ANTITRUSf BULL 457 (1991) (suggesting that courts should presume ties 
unlawful because transaction costs facilitate opportunism). 
13. See Alan H. Silberman, The Myths of Franchise "Market Power," 65 ANTITRUSf L.J. 
181, 206 (1996) ("[A) franchisor market power assessment requires reference to all 
alternatives available to the potential consumer [i.e., the franchisee) in a broad line of 
business endeavors. In many cases this will extend to the market for franchises of all 
types or the employment of capital."); Benjamin Klein and Lester F. Saft, The Law and 
Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts,28 J.L. & ECON. 345,356 (1985) (noting the lack of 
franchisor market power despite trademark); see also Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of 
N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342,1346-47 (9th Cir. 1987). 
14. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-17 (1984) (holding 
that per se rule against tying is designed to identify those instances in which seller 
possesses market power sufficient to "force" purchaser to take unwanted tied product). 
15. See Queen City Pizza, 124 F.3d at 445-46 (Lay, J. dissenting) (arguing that 
reasoning of Eastman Kodak requires conclusion that franchisors possess market power 
where franchisees with imperfect information have made relationship-specific 
investments); Collins v. Int'l Dairy Queen, 980 F. Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (M.D. Ga. 1997) 
(same); Grimes, Franchisors and Market Power, supra note 6, at 112-16, 125-26. 
16. See Grimes, Franchisors and Market Power, supra note 6, at 112-16, 125-26 
(applying reasoning of Eastman Kodak in franchising context). 
17. See id. at 123-25, 127-29, 133-34; Wilson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 940 F. Supp. 944, 953-
54 (E.D. La. 1996) ("[I]t is not self-evident to this Court that before-the-fact disclosure of 
the tie-in means in all cases that information costs are not so high as to preclude 
accurate lifecyde pricing"); see also Slawson, supra note 12, at 482-87. 
18. See Grimes, Franchisors and Market Power, supra note 6, at 142-51; see also 
Slawson, supra note 12, at 494-501 (arguing that, in light of bargaining and information 
costs, courts should declare ties "per se" unlawful, subject to assertion of an affirmative 
defense). As a doctrinal matter, these scholars would hold that the presence of 
relationship-specific investments, coupled with lack of pre-investment knowledge of 
the tie, constitutes "market power" of the sort necessary to establish a per se violation. 
See generally Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 471-78 (adopting this approach); Jefferson 
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Similar considerations purportedly require hostile treatment 
of the maximum resale price maintenance ("rpm") policy.19 
Here again, franchisees have been "locked in" to their 
relationships with the franchisor.2o Because franchisors can 
abuse their positions by imposing maximum rpm, such policies 
should be presumed unlawful, subject to proof that they are, on 
balance, procompetitive.21 Indeed, the case for intervention 
here is in some sense stronger than it was with respect to the 
tying agreement. There, at least, franchisees could have warned 
themselves of the potential for opportunism by reading their 
contracts.22 Nothing in the contract hypothesized here, 
however, alerted franchisees to the possibility that the 
franchisor could impose a price ceiling.23 Franchisees could 
have protected themselves in advance by negotiating for a 
clause that granted them explicit protection against such 
behavior.24 Here again, however, bargaining and information 
Parish, 466 U.S. at 11-18 (holding that proof of market power is necessary to establish 
per se liability). Despite the "per se" label, some courts would allow sellers to assert a 
business justification defense. See Mozart, 833 F.2d at 1348-50. 
19. See Grimes, Vertical Maximum Price Fixing, supra note 4, at 580-81; LAWRENCE A. 
SULUV AN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 391 (1977) (arguing that potential for 
opportunism by franchisors justifies per se rule against maximum rpm). See also Brief 
for the Service Station Dealers of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 
*6-8, State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275 (1997) (No. 96-871) (arguing that suppliers use 
maximum resale price maintenance to exploit dealers' relationship-specific 
investments); Brief for Minnesota Service Station and Convenience Store Association, et 
al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at *5-10, State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. 
Ct. 275 (1997) (No. 96-781) (same). 
20. See Grimes, Vertical Maximum Price Fixing, supra note 4, at 586-89. 
21. See id. at589-604. See generally State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275 (1997) (holding 
that maximum resale price maintenance is judged under rule of reason). 
22 See Queen City Pizza, 124 F.3d at 441 (rejecting franchisees' claim that tie was 
imposed by means of market power where contractual requirement was present in 
initial franchise contract); Wilson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 984 F. Supp. 450, 459-61 (E. D. La. 
1997) (same). See generally Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 489-90 (3d Cir. 1992) (en bane) (holding that the antitrust laws 
adopt a posture of caveat emptor and thus do not view unfair consumer surprise as a 
cognizable harm). 
23. See Collins v. Int'l Dairy Queen, 980 F. Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (M.D. Ga. 1997) 
(finding that franchisor could possess market power under Eastman Kodak because 
franchisor departed from terms of franchise agreement, which contemplated that 
franchisees could choose independent suppliers); Queen City Pizza, 124 F.3d at 448-49 
(Lay, J., dissenting) (arguing that imperfect information prevented franchisees from 
protecting themselves where tying clause was "applied [by franchisor] in such an odd 
and predatory way"). 
24. See Lande, supra note 12, at 200 ("Absent imperfect information [franchisor] rent 
extraction would not be a concern, for no franchisee would sign a franchisee agreement 
that would enable the franchisor unfairly to extract its goodwill."); see also Carl J. 
Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 148 (1979) ("[I]f there were 
adequate ... foreknowledge ... [policing and enforcement] costs could be avoided by 
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costs likely prevent such a strategy. 
Unlike the tying contract or the maximum rpm agreement_ 
the purported encroachment is a purely unilateral act, and thus 
cognizable only under section 2 of the Act.25 At first glance, it 
would seem that PizzaShack lacks market power in any 
relevant market, with the result that no claim under this section 
is possible.26 However, the presence of relationship-specific 
investments suggests a market consisting of PizzaShack 
franchisees, of which PizzaShack presumably has a 
monopoly-literally.27 Absent some legitimate business reason 
for doing so, appointment of new franchisees that encroach on 
existing ones should be deemed an abuse of monopoly power 
and thus void. 28 
II. CREATING AN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK THAT MINIMIZES 
TRANSACTION COSTS 
This story of franchisor opportunism is certainly a plausible 
one. Moreover, the case for antitrust regulation is 
straightforward-resting, as it does, on a market failure 
produced by bargaining and information costs.29 When such 
costs are present, they may produce a "lemons equilibrium"-
contractual stipulations or by declining to trade with ... agents ... known to avoid 
fulfilling their obligations."). 
25. See generally Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); 
United States v. Colgate Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
26. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (finding that the 
possession of monopoly power is a necessary element of a monopolization claim); 
Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594,611-13 (1953) (holding that 40 
percent of the relevant market is insufficient to show the "market dominance" 
necessary for a monopolization claim); see also Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 
U.S. 447, 447-48 (1993) (holding that a claim for attempted monopolization requires" 
dangerous probability that defendant will obtain monopoly power). 
27. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481-82 (holding that the presence of relationship-
specific investments created triable issue of fact on question of whether Eastman Kodak 
had a 100% share of the market of its own spare parts sold to locked-in consumers); 
Grimes, Franchisors and Market Power, supra note 6, at 139; Collins, 980 F. Supp. at 1258-
61 (relying on Eastman Kodak to deny franchisor's motion for summary judgment on 
claim that franchisor monopolized a relevant market of "products sold to Dairy Queen 
franchisees located in the United States (outside of Texas)"). 
28. See Grimes, Franchisors and Market Power, supra note 6, at 136-41. 
29. See KENNETH G. ELZINGA & WILliAM BREIT, THE ANTITRUSf PENALTIES 6 (1976) 
("[I]n a world of no transactions or information costs (and one in which people did not 
attempt to act as free riders), the benefits of competitive markets would readily be 
secured."); Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A 
Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 70 (1968) ("Assuming no transaction costs, those who lose 
from the relative underproduction of monopolies could bribe monopolists to produce 
more."). 
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that is, a deviation from the quality of franchise opportunity 
that would have been produced in their absence.3° In this 
context, the treble-damage remedy of the Sherman Act can be 
seen as a liability rule that discourages the sort of opportunism 
that might otherwise be prompted by market failure.3t 
The mere fact that one can tell a plausible story of 
opportunism does not, without more, justify antitrust 
intervention. The question remains whether the costs of such 
intervention outweigh its benefits.32 Some have argued that this 
criterion is not met where franchisor opportunism is 
concerned. Franchisees are free to evaluate the terms and 
conditions of franchise contracts, as well as any potential for 
opportunism that such agreements might create.33 Franchisees 
that fear opportunism can protect themselves by negotiating 
contractual protection or, in the alternative, "exiting" and 
signing on with a franchisor that has a reputation for 
trustworthiness.34 This latter course-migrating to trustworthy 
franchisors-will ensure that franchise opportunities are priced 
to reflect both their contractual terms and the franchisor's 
reputation.35 Moreover, to the extent that a franchisor attempts 
to engage in post-contractual opportunism, it will suffer in the 
marketplace as its reputation for fair dealing deteriorates, 
thereby reducing the price that it can command for franchise 
opportunities in the future.36 While admitting that relationship-
30. See George A. Akerloff, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 489 (1970); see also Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Balancing in 
a (Near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 MICH. L. REV. 111, 134 
n.108 (1996) (noting that a franchise can be analogized "to a durable good, the 
characteristics of which cannot be observed in advance"). 
31. See Calabresi, supra note 29, at 69-71. 
32. See Ronald H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law, in THE FIRM, TilE MARKET, 
AND 1HE LAW 26 (1988). 
33. See Silberman, supra note 13, at 210-14; Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitmst: 
Economic Analysis After Kodak, 3 SUP. cr. ECON. REV. 43, 50-51 (1993); Roger D. Blair & 
John E. Lopatka, The Albrecht Rule After Khan: Death Becomes Her, 74 NomE DAME L. 
REV. 123, 167 (1998) (arguing that opportunistic imposition of resale price ceiling 
should not be scrutinized under the Sherman Act because "[t]he return the dealer 
expects for performing distribution services is the very heart of the transaction with her 
supplier . . . . The dealer has both a keen incentive and ability to protect herself 
contractually from subsequent opportunism on the part of the supplier."). 
34. See Klein, supra note 33, at 50-53. 
35. See id. at 57 (stating that "dealers [are] presumably adequately compensated for 
the residual risk they voluntarily assumed in the contractual arrangement"); see also 
Meese, Antitrust Balancing In A (Near) Coasean World, supra note 30, at 133-41 (arguing 
that the price of a franchise opportunity will reflect contractual terms). 
36. See George A. Hay, Is the Glass Half-Empty or Half-Full?: Reflections on the Kodak 
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specific investments can create the potential for abuse, those 
scholars who argue against federal intervention also point out 
that such investments might serve useful purposes as 
"hostages" that franchisors may use to deter opportunism by 
franchisees.37 Indeed, the sort of contractual devices most often 
deemed opportunistic -tying arrangements and maximum 
rpm-can be methods of controlling franchisee opportunism.3s 
Treating "hostages" designed to enforce such agreements as a 
source of market power that renders these contractual 
provisions presumptively unlawful may do more harm than 
good.39 
This critique of using antitrust law to thwart franchisor 
opportunism is powerful, maybe even compelling. Even if this 
critique fails, however, there is another, more fundamental 
problem with the case for Sherman Act regulation in this 
context. That is to say, even if the sort of opportunism 
described earlier is plausible, and even if some form of 
intervention is necessary to prevent it, proponents of Sherman 
Act regulation have not explained why federal intervention is 
necessary. More precisely, these advocates have ignored the 
role that state law can and does play in reducing transaction 
costs and subsequent market failures. 
As noted earlier, the possibility of opportunism depends 
upon bargaining and information costs that prevent franchisees 
Case, 62 ANTITRUsr L.J. 177, 185-88 (1993); Parts and Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., 
Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 236 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
37. See Klein, supra note 33, at 62-63. See generally Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic 
Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REv. 521, 523, 575-80 (1981) (arguing that 
shirking by franchisees is a paradigmatic example of opportunistic behavior). 
38. See Klein & Saft, supra note 13, at 350-54; Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical 
Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA L. REV. 143, 165-66 (1997) (describing how 
maximum rpm can prevent franchisee opportunism) [hereinafter Meese, Price Theory 
and Vertical Restraints]. See generally Silberman, supra note 13, at 212-13 (suggesting that 
restraints in franchise contract can be part of the bundle of rights that maximizes value 
of franchise opportunity); Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the 
Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & ECON. 223, 227-28 (1978). 
39. See Klein & Saft, supra note 13, at 352-53 (arguing that, by outlawing effective 
vertical controls, courts may induce franchisors to seek additional relationship-specific 
investments from franchisees, thus making franchisees even more vulnerable to 
opportunism). One could mitigate the harmful effects of antitrust intervention in this 
context by relaxing the standards employed to evaluate the justifications that a 
franchisor might advance for such a change in policy. See generally Meese, Antitrust 
Balancing In A (Near) Coasean World, supra note 30, at 129-45 (arguing for a relaxation of 
the standards employed to evaluate affirmative defenses to tying contracts that are 
otherwise per se unlawful); Klein & Saft, supra note 13, at 352-53. Still, such a regime 
would outlaw all such contracts that could not be justified, regardless of whether they 
produced any real anticompetitive effect. 
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from protecting themselves in advance by contract or exit.4o In 
a world beset by such costs, a franchisor can insert onerous 
clauses in the franchise contract without suffering in the 
marketplace (i.e., without any reduction in the price it might 
command for the opportunities it sells).41 Moreover, the 
franchisor can engage in various forms of post-contractual 
opportunism unhampered by any agreement franchisees 
would have negotiated absent transaction costs.42 
Although this story is plausible, it depends upon a particular 
institutional framework and the transaction costs that this 
framework might create.43 Consider first the tying clause, 
inserted in the initial franchise contract. Proponents of Sherman 
Act regulation of franchisor opportunism assume that such a 
clause would be binding, regardless of whether the franchisee 
was aware of it and regardless of how onerous it is. Certainly 
this is true under the original Restatement of Contracts, which 
provided that parties had a "duty to read" their contracts and 
thus were bound to any terms contained therein.44 In a "duty to 
read" regime, the possibility of such opportunism could be real 
and may justify Sherman Act regulation. 
Such a story is far less plausible if one substitutes a different 
regime of contract law to govern the transaction-namely, the 
Second Restatement. Under this regime, any clause in a 
standard form contract that is outside the reasonable 
expectation of the parties will not be enforced, absent 
subjective assent by the party to be bound.45 Thus, a franchisor 
40. See supra notes 18, 23-24 and accompanying text. 
41. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text. 
42 See supra notes 16, 19-20 and accompanying text. 
43. See Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure Of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 
713,714 (1992). This essay uses the phrase "institutional framework" as shorthand for 
what Professor Coase calls "the institutional structure of production" (i.e., 
"institutional arrangements which govern the process of exchange"). 
44. See RESTATEMENT (FIRSr) OF CONTRACIS § 70; Sanger v. Dun, 3 N.W. 388, 389 
(Wis. 1879) ("It will not do for a man to enter into a contract, and, when called upon to 
abide by its conditions, say that he did not read it when he signed it, or did not know 
what it contained."); see also JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH PERILLO, THE LAW OF 
CONTRACIS 376-77 (4th ed. 1998) (describing "Traditional Rule" on the duty to read); 
Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty To Read-Business Run by IBM Machine, 
the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1052-55 (1966) (same). 
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACIS § 211(3) (stating that standard terms are 
not binding when the proponent of the contract "has reason to believe that the party 
manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a 
particular term"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACIS § 211 cmt. f (stating that 
buyers "are not bound to unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable 
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could not enforce a tying clause that a court might deem 
unduly onerous unless it had called the clause to the 
franchisee's attention, explained it, and obtained the 
franchisee's subjective assent to it.46 
Such a regime can lower the transaction costs that 
accompany the negotiation of the franchise contract and 
encourage opportunism. Franchisees who sign standard 
franchise contracts can rely upon the franchisor to insert only 
those clauses that are within the reasonable expectation of the 
parties, and thus, they need not expend resources carefully 
scrutinizing the agreement.47 Franchisors that want to enforce 
questionable terms must disclose them. Tiris disclosure will 
produce information and reduce the franchisee's costs of 
identifying such clauses. If an unduly onerous clause is 
disclosed it will be priced, thus deterring the franchisor from 
adopting it in the first place.4s If administered as advertised, 
"expectation") (emphasis added); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 44, at 389-90; John 
E. Murray, Jr., The Standard Agreement Phenomenon In The Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 735, 765-79 (1982). 
46. For an application of this principle in the franchising context that pre-dates the 
adoption of the Second Restatement, see Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144 
(Ind. 1971) (refusing to enforce oppressive term in a standard franchise contract when 
the franchisor had not obtained the franchisee's subjective assent to the term). 
47. The authors of section 211 apparently recognized that this provision could serve 
such a purpose. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS, § 211 cmt. b ("One of the 
purposes of standardization is to eliminate bargaining over details of individual 
transactions, and that purpose would not be served if a substantial number of 
customers retained counsel and reviewed the standard terms."); see also Meese, 
Antitrust Balancing In A (Near) Coasean World, supra note 30, at 139 n.132 (suggesting that 
section 211 can lower transaction costs). 
Over a decade before section 211 was adopted, Professor Macaulay recognized that 
relaxation of the duty to read could facilitate trust between the parties and obviate the 
necessity of careful scrutiny of a standard agreement: 
Perhaps more often transactional policy will call for overturning or modifying 
a written document (by reforming or construing it) in the light of the bargain-
in-fact of the parties. While a case can be made for self-reliance, part of decent 
social and business conduct is trust. ln many negotiation situations all of the 
pressures push for friendly gestures rather than a suspicious line-by-line 
analysis of the writing. The buyer of home siding can believe the president of 
the home remodeling company when he says his siding will not rust or crack; 
the buyer does not have to parse the text of the lengthy and technical printed 
form and spot the integration clause at his peril. 
Macaulay, supra note 44, at 1061 (footnote omitted). Cf. Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, 
Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 4-5 (1978) (arguing that 
when "there is a ... gap in the contract-a court concerned with economic efficiency 
should impose the risk on the better information-gatherer . . . . [B]y allocating the risk 
in this way, an efficiency-minded court reduces the transaction costs of the contracting 
process itself") (footnote omitted). 
48. See Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and 
Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 29-31 (1993) (observing that rules that induce 
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then, section 211 operates as a sort of liability rule that can 
reduce transaction costs that might otherwise prevent 
franchisees from locating and pricing onerous terms.49 
The realization that section 211 can reduce the transaction 
costs that might otherwise produce a lemons equilibrium in 
contractual terms is merely an application of a larger principle 
recognized by Professor Coase and others-namely, that the 
extent and nature of transaction costs are not exogenous to the 
institutional framework but are instead a function of it. As 
Professor Coase put it in his Nobel lecture: 
[T]he rights which individuals possess, with their duties and 
privileges, will be, to a large extent, what the law 
determines. As a result, the legal system will have a 
profound effect on the working of the economic system and 
may in certain respects be said to control it .... It makes little 
sense for economists to discuss the process of exchange 
without specifying the institutional setting within which the 
trading takes place. so 
Indeed, Professor Coase himself anticipated the analysis of 
section 211laid out above. In describing the various steps the 
state could take to reduce the cost of transacting and thus 
eliminate market failure, Coase said: 
Since, by and large, people choose to perform those actions 
which they think will promote their own interests, the way 
to alter their behaviour in the economic sphere is to make it 
disclosure of contractual terms will lead terms to be priced); Annen Alchian & Harold 
Demsetz, The Property Rights Paradigm, 33 J. ECON. HlST. 16, 21 (1973) (showing that 
interference with price system increases bargaining costs); F.A. Hayek, The Use of 
Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REv. 519, 526-27 (1945) (noting that price system 
impounds information and reduces the cost of transacting). 
49. See Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World, supra note 30, at 139 
n.132; Craswell, supra note 48, at 10-12, 49-51 (arguing that "liability rule" refusing to 
enforce unreasonable terms can prevent occurrence of lemons equilibrium in contract 
terms); see also Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The 
Consumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U. L. REV. 661,697-98 (1982) (arguing that ties that arise 
due to market failure should be addressed via disclosure remedies). Cf. Salil Kumar, 
Comment, Parts and Service Included: An Information-Centered Approach to Kodak and the 
Problem of Aftermarket Monopolies, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1521, 1538-44 (1995) (proposing 
rule whereby disclosure of competitive terms by durable goods monopolist precludes 
liability under Kodak). 
50. Cease, Institutional Structure, supra note 43, at 717-18; see also Victor P. Goldberg, 
Production Functions, Transaction Costs, and the New Institutionalism, in READINGS IN THE 
ECONOMICS OF CoN1RAcr LAW (Victor P. Goldberg ed. 1989) ("Transaction costs are 
those costs most likely to differ under alternative institutional arrangements."); Ronald 
H. Cease, The Choice of the Institutional Framework: A Comment, 17 J.L. & EcoN. 493,493 
(1974) ("[T]he way in which property rights are defined can affect the costs of 
transactions, [and] any change in those rights will affect the transactions that are 
carried out .... "). 
No.1] Regulation of Franchisor Opportunism 
in their interest to do so. The only means available to the 
government for doing this (apart from exhortation, which is 
commonly ineffective) is a change in the law or its 
administration. The forms such changes may take are many. 
They may amend the rights and duties which people are 
allowed to acquire or are deemed to possess, or they may 
make transactions more or less costly by altering the 
requirements for making a legally binding contract. 51 
73 
Section 211 follows Professor Coase' s admonition. 
Franchisors can only acquire the right to control a franchisee's 
purchasing decisions when such control is reasonable, or when 
the franchisee has explicitly agreed to cede such control. 
Moreover, by "altering the requirements for making a legally 
binding contract"52-that is, by changing the definition of 
"agreement" -the provision reduces the franchisee's cost of 
identifying and pricing a potentially onerous term. Thus, 
section 211 reduces transaction costs and discourages 
franchisors from inserting onerous clauses. 
Section 211 is not the only adjustment of contract law that 
can alter the institutional framework and reduce the cost of 
transacting. Fraud and unconscionability doctrines can perform 
similar functions.53 This is not to say that adjustment of the 
institutional framework can reduce to zero the costs of 
negotiating and enforcing franchise agreements. Short of an 
outright subsidy, no rule of law can eliminate the cost of 
reading an agreement or dickering over its terms. Still, by its 
nature, pre-contractual opportunism involves insertion and 
subsequent enforcement of terms that appear beyond the 
reasonable expectation of the parties. By declining to enforce 
such clauses absent disclosure and assent, courts that follow 
section 211 or similar rules can reduce to zero the franchisee's 
cost of identifying an unduly onerous contractual term that is 
legally enforceable. Thus, even in the "real world," where 
bargaining and information costs are present, reforms in the 
51. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law, supra note 32, at 27-28. 
52 /d. at28. 
53. By penalizing intentional fraud, for instance, states can ensure that purchasers 
need not take (wasteful) precautions to verify a seller's representations, thus reducing 
the cost of transactions. See Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 
910 F.2d 1540, 1546 (7th Cir. 1990); Teamsters Local282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 
762 F.2d 522, 527-28 (7th Cir. 1985). Similarly, by banning oppressive contractual terms 
under the doctrine of unconscionability, states can obviate the necessity of wasteful 
pre-contractual investigation. 
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institutional framework can prevent the sort of pre-contractual 
opportunism that might otherwise arise and change the content 
of the agreements produced by negotiation between franchisor 
and franchisee. 54 
This is all well and good when applied to pre-contractual 
opportunism. But what about the sort of post-contractual 
opportunism discussed earlier?ss What if, for instance, a 
franchisor announces a maximum rpm policy after the contract 
has been signed, and after the franchisee has made 
relationship-specific investments? Section 211 would have no 
bearing on such a policy, which has been clearly announced to 
franchisees, who must adhere to it under threat of termination. 
In this context, the transaction costs that prevent franchisees 
from protecting themselves in advance are, in fact, exogenous, 
suggesting that some form of antitrust intervention is 
necessary. Similar considerations would seem to counsel 
antitrust intervention to combat unreasonable encroachment. 
It is true that a franchisor that wished to enforce a new 
maximum rpm policy, or to encroach on its existing 
franchisees, would find no opposition from section 211. The 
franchisor would, however, have to contend with other 
background rules of contract law, most notably the covenant of 
good faith. This covenant, implied in all contracts, prevents 
either party from taking steps that deprive the other party of its 
legitimate expectations under the agreement.s6 Indeed, some 
states have essentially codified this covenant in franchisee 
protection statutes that prevent termination except for "good 
54. See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 43, at 716-18 (explaining that legal 
institutions can affect transaction costs and thus the nature of transactions that take 
place). 
55. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (discussing various forms o£ post-
contractual opportunism). 
56. See, e.g., Hentze v. Unverferht, 604 N.E.2d 536, 539 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (finding 
that the implied covenant of good faith forbids "opportunistic advantage-taking or lack 
of cooperation depriving the other contracting party of his reasonable expectations") 
(citations omitted); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 727-28 (7th Cir. 
1979) (stating that according to California law, the covenant of good faith prevents the 
franchisor from destroying "the right of the other party to enjoy the fruits of the 
contract"); Burger King Corp. v. Agad, 941 F. Supp. 1217, 1221 (N.D. Ga. 1996) 
(applying Florida law to find that "[t]he implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing requires that 'a party vested with contractual discretion must exercise that 
discretion reasonably and with proper motive, and may not do so arbitrarily, 
capriciously, or in a manner inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the 
parties"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRA CIS§ 205; U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-103(1)(b). 
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cause."57 Assume, for a moment, that a franchisor announces a 
price ceiling, and terminates a franchisee for failing to adhere 
to it. Assume further that the price set by the franchisor was 
unreasonably low and could not be justified as an attempt to 
prevent opportunistic price gouging by franchisees.ss Such 
behavior by the franchisor would deprive the franchisee of at 
least a portion of the profits it expected to derive under the 
agreement in question and could thus breach the good faith 
covenant. 
A similar analysis would apply if the franchisor were to 
appoint franchisees that encroached on the location of 
established franchisees, or if it opened its own outlets that 
encroached in this manner. If the creation of these outlets 
deprived the franchisee of its legitimate expectations under the 
agreement, such a deprivation would offend the good faith 
covenant. 59 
Implied covenants do not trump express contractual terms.6o 
An act expressly authorized by an agreement cannot, by 
57. See Moore v. Tandy Corp., 819 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1987) (reading Wisconsin Fair 
Dealership Law to apply only where dealer has made relationship-specific 
investments); Grand Light & Supply Co., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672, 677-78 
(2d Cir. 1985) (reading Connecticut Franchise Act similarly); Burns, supra note 12, at 
617-24 (describing such statutes and their requirements). 
58. See Meese, Pn"ce Theory And Vertical Restraints, supra note 38, at 165-66 (describing 
how price-cutting dealers can lure customers away from other dealers who have 
invested heavily in marketing). Such price gouging by franchisees could violate their 
undertaking of good faith, and thus be grounds for termination. Cf. Dayan v. 
McDonald's Corp., 466 N.E.2d 958, 975 (lll. App. Ct. 1984) (finding that a termination 
for failure to satisfy quality standards was in good faith, regardless of what other 
motives franchisor may have had). 
59. See, e.g., Vylene Enterprises, Inc. v. Naugles, Inc. (In re Vylene), 90 F.3d 1472, 
1477 (9th Cir. 1996); Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 798 F. Supp. 692, 694-700 (S.D. Fla. 
1992); Photovest Corp., 606 F.2d at 728. See generally Marc A. Wites, The Franchisor As 
Predator: Encroachment and the Implied Covenant of Good Faith, 7 FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
305 (1996). But cf. Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310,1317-18 (11th Cir. 1999). 
60. See, e.g., Hentze, 604 N.E.2d at 539 (stating that good faith covenant is implied 
"absent express disavowal .•.. [C)ontract terms implied in law cannot supplant 
express terms of a contract.") (citations omitted); L.A.P.D., Inc. v. General Elec. Corp., 
132 F.3d 402, 403-04 (7th Cir. 1997); Hubbard Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors Corp., 
873 F.2d 873, 877-78 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying Michigan Law); Domed Stadium Hotel, 
Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 1984) ("The implied obligation to 
execute a contract in good faith usually modifies the express terms of the contract and 
should not be used to override or contradict them."); see also U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (stating 
that parties may "by agreement determine the standards by which the performance of 
such [good faith] obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly 
unreasonable"); ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 121 1/2, 704.3 (defining "good cause" for 
franchise termination as, among other things, "failure of the franchise to comply with 
any lawful provision of the franchise or other agreement"). 
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definition, deprive the other party of its expectations.61 Because 
parties can contract around it, the implied covenant of good 
faith plays much the same role with respect to post-contractual 
opportunism that section 211 can play where pre-contractual 
opportunism is involved. By treating various forms of 
opportunism as a breach, this covenant reduces the bargaining 
and information costs that would otherwise prevent 
franchisees from protecting themselves in advance by contract 
or exit.62 For instance, if a franchisor wishes to impose an 
onerous price ceiling, it must secure the right to do so in an 
explicit agreement with the franchisee. Similarly, if a franchisor 
wishes to encroach on a franchisee's operations in a way that 
destroys its reasonable expectations, it must obtain an 
agreement to do so in advance.63 Any attempt to obtain such an 
agreement could be made subject to the provisions of section 
211.64 Thus, franchisees need not anticipate each conceivable 
act of franchisor opportunism and preclude it by contract. 
Judicious application of the good faith covenant, then, can 
produce an institutional framework that blocks the 
opportunism that might otherwise occur under a different 
framework with higher transaction costs. 
I do not mean to suggest that all states have constructed 
institutional frameworks that minimize, to the extent possible, 
the transaction costs that can engender franchisor opportunism. 
Nor should readers take this essay as an endorsement of each 
state law doctrine described above. Determining whether a 
clause is within the parties' "reasonable expectations" or 
61. See Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. D-Mart Food Stores, Inc., 431 N.W.2d 721, 726 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1988) ("[I]t would be a contradiction in terms to characterize an act 
contemplated by the plain language of the parties' contract as a 'bad faith' breach of 
that contract."). 
62 See Kham & Nate Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 
(7th Cir. 1990) ("'Good faith' is a compact reference to an implied undertaking not to 
take opportunistic advantage in a way that could not have been contemplated at the 
time of drafting, and which therefore was not resolved explicitly by the parties."). 
63. See Scheck, 798 F. Supp. at 699-700 ("If a franchise agreement gives the franchisor 
the right to build (or permit building) another store next door to the one earlier 
permitted, it had better say so in clear terms. If it does not-if the franchisor has not 
given unto itself the right to be predatory-then it should be prepared to defend its 
position on a good faith-that is, reasonable conduct-basis."); Carlock v. Pillsbury 
Co., 719 F. Supp. 791, 819-20 (D. Minn. 1989) (rejecting franchisee's claim that mass 
distribution of Haagen-Dazs products breached covenant of good faith where contract 
expressly provided that franchisor could distribute such products "by any method"); 
Cook v. Little Caesar Enters., Inc., 972 F. Supp. 400,409-10 (E. D. Mich. 1997). 
64. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. 
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second-guessing one or the other parties' business decisions 
can be a tricky business; substitution of imperfect judicial 
oversight for imperfect markets will not invariably produce a 
net social improvement.65 Such caution is particularly 
appropriate in the franchising context, where apparently 
"unfair" arrangements, including termination, may serve 
useful purposes that are difficult to explain to courts.66 The 
claim made here is a more modest one. The case for Sherman 
Act intervention depends upon the presence of transaction 
costs, which prevent franchisees from protecting themselves-
through negotiation or exit-from onerous, legally-binding 
contractual terms or post-contractual opportunism. Transaction 
costs do not exist in a vacuum, but they are instead a function 
of the institutional framework constructed by the background 
legal regime, particularly the law of contracts. The case for 
Sherman Act regulation of franchisor opportunism, then, 
necessarily depends upon a conclusion that, despite state law 
regimes, transaction costs are still so high as to engender 
opportunism. If, on the other hand, the institutional 
framework is such that transaction costs are low, the case for 
antitrust intervention evaporates.67 
TIL PRODUCTION OF TilE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: STATE 
COMPETITION OR FEDERAL MONOPOLY? 
The realization that state law can reduce transaction costs 
and deter opportunistic behavior has important implications 
for attempts to employ the Sherman Act in the franchising 
context. As previously noted, proponents of Sherman Act 
regulation of franchisor opportunism would erect a 
presumption that such costs are present and can engender 
opportunism whenever a franchisee has made relationship-
specific investments.68 If transaction costs are a function of state 
law, however, it would seem that franchisees should bear the 
burden of establishing the existence of such costs, taking into 
65. See Craswell, supra note 48, at 49-51; Cease, The Firm, the Market, and the Law, 
supra note 32, at 20-28; Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 
76 GEO. L.J. 305 (1987). 
66. See Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determlnants of Unfair Contractual 
Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 356, 358-60 (1980). 
67. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (explaining that opportunism depends 
upon the existence of transaction costs). 
68. See supra notes 27-28. 
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account the entirety of the institutional framework generated 
by the state whose law would otherwise govern the transaction 
or relationship in question.69 For instance, franchisees who 
claim that they are victims of pre-contractual opportunism 
should shoulder the burden of establishing that the contractual 
provision in question is enforceable under whatever contract 
law governs the transaction. 
This realization also raises a more fundamental question 
about the proper allocation of regulatory authority between 
states and the federal government. If the case for Sherman Act 
intervention depends upon the presence of transaction costs, 
and if states are capable of reducing such costs by changing the 
rules that make up the institutional framework, why is 
Sherman Act regulation of purported opportunism necessary? 
Put another way, the Sherman Act is only one particular 
method-and a rather inflexible method at that-of combating 
market failure. Why prefer it to whatever remedy or remedies 
that a state may choose to impose? Why, for instance, should 
federal courts, operating under the aegis of the Sherman Act, 
second-guess a state court's treatment of a clause obligating a 
franchisee to purchase inputs only from the franchisor? Or, if a 
franchisor should encroach on a franchisee's territory without 
justification, why second-guess the remedy that a state court 
might order for breach of the covenant of good faith implied by 
the common law or codified in a state franchisee-protection 
statute?70 Presumably, states strive to construct institutional 
frameworks that minimize the costs associated with 
commercial transactions, including the costs of opportunism 
and judicial intervention to prevent it. Why not rely upon 
competition between these states to generate the most effective 
institutional frameworks for reducing the transaction costs that 
can engender opportunism in purchase and sale transactions? 
After all, this is the approach that antitrust would take in the 
case of the opportunistic building contractor described earlier, 
even if such conduct were otherwise within the scope of 
69. See Eastman Kodak, Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 
(1992) ("Legal presumptions that rest upon formalistic distinctions rather than actual 
market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law."). 
70. See, e.g., Dlinois Motor Vehicle Franchise Act,815 ILL COMP. STATS. 710/13 (West 
1995) (providing treble damages for "willful or wanton" misconduct as defined by the 
Act). 
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Federal Commerce power.71 Absent a showing that such 
behavior injures third parties, such as consumers, there is no 
direct restraint of interstate commerce with the result that 
federal intervention is unwarranted. 72 
To be sure, the mere fact that state law can reduce the sort of 
transaction costs engendering opportunism does not mean that 
it will reduce such costs. As this essay noted at the outset, 
Delaware could develop a body of corporate law that prevented 
anticompetitive mergers, although one suspects that it would 
not. Instead, Delaware would most likely compete with other 
states to offer corporate law that would maximize corporate 
profits, and, in so doing, would approve transactions that 
exported costs to other states.73 Indeed, the whole reason for 
federal antitrust regulation is that states may be unable or 
unwilling to combat anticompetitive conduct that imposes 
costs on out-of-state consumers, consumers who cannot protect 
themselves by bargaining with the offending state.74 Thus, 
71. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 
858, 862 (1985) (holding Congress may punish arson of apartment building under the 
commerce power); Grimes, Vertical Maximum Price Fixing, supra note 4, at 594 
(conceding that Sherman Act should not reach opportunism by building contractor). It 
is very hard to distinguish the contractor's opportunism from that of a franchisor that 
encroaches on a franchisee's territory. Such encroachment involves abuse of the 
franchisor's monopoly over a market consisting of the franchisee's opportunity. See 
Grimes, Franchisors and Market Power, supra note 6, at 139. Similarly, the contractor's 
threatened breach involves abuse of its monopoly in a market defined as the 
completion of my house. 
72 See Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 826 (1945) ("[The Sherman] Act does not 
purport to afford remedies for all torts committed by or against persons engaged in 
interstate commerce."); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 518-69 (1898) 
(Sherman Act forbids only those contracts that directly raise the price of interstate 
transactions); see also Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World, supra note 30, 
at 145-48 (describing an (implausible) scheme whereby franchise system obtains market 
power vis a vis consumers via raising rivals' costs strategy). Moreover, it seems unlikely 
that opportunism will raise consumer prices. See Hay, supra note 36, at 187 (arguing 
that opportunism via franchise tying contracts will reduce franchise sales in light of 
competition from other franchise systems). 
73. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
74. See Northern Sec. Co., 193 U.S. 197, 345-46 (1904) ("No State can, by merely 
creating a corporation, or in any other mode, project its authority into other States, and 
across the continent, so as to prevent Congress from exerting the power it possesses 
under the Constitution over interstate and international ... commerce.") (emphasis 
added), Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 231-32 (1899) ("If it 
should be held that Congress has no power and the state legislatures have full and 
complete authority to thus far regulate interstate commerce by means of their control 
over private contracts between individual or corporations, then the legislation of the 
different States might and probably would differ in regard to the matter, according to 
what each State might regard as its own particular interest.") (emphasis added); see also 
Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, supra note 2, at 38-40. 
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Sherman Act regulation of multi-state mergers satisfies James 
Wilson's criteria for federal intervention, as the "object of 
government" extends "beyond the bounds of a particular 
state/' given the existence of transaction costs that prevent out-
of-state consumers from bargaining with states that would 
otherwise regulate such conduct.75 If competition between the 
states can lead to suboptimal corporate law, perhaps it might 
also lead to suboptimal contract law. Or perhaps such 
competition will prevent states from adopting statutory 
regimes that remedy any shortcomings in the common law. If 
the competitive process that generates the institutional 
framework within which parties transact is itself fraught with a 
market failure, then conditions are ripe for interstate 
exploitation and Sherman Act regulation may be appropriate.76 
Competition between the states to generate legal regimes is 
not always characterized by a market failure. Some scholars 
have made a strong case that state competition has produced 
optimal rules of corporate law, for instance.77 Such rules 
provide the background regime governing a special form of 
relational contract-the corporate charter.7B Proponents of 
employing the Sherman Act to regulate opportunism, then, 
75. As James Wilson put it at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention: 
Whatever object of government is confined in its operation and effects, within 
the bounds of a particular state, should be considered as belonging to the 
government of that state; whatever object of government extends, in its 
operation or effects, beyond the bounds of a particular state, should be 
considered as belonging to the government of the United States. 
James Wilson, Speech in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 21, 1787), in 
DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSI'ITUTION 424 Q'onathon Elliot ed., 2d 
ed. 1888) (emphasis added). 
76. See Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J.L. & 
ECON. 461, 461 (1974) (stating that "not only will people pursue their self-interest 
within the rules; they will also allocate the resource toward changing the rules toward 
their own benefit"); id. at 472-74, 483-86 (arguing that firms may prefer and lobby for 
"regulation" via regime of private contract as it empowers them to foist inefficient 
terms on consumers). 
77. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14-31 
(1993) (arguing that empirical studies suggest that competition between the states 
produces a "race to the top" in the production of corporate law); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., 
State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 
(1977); see also Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2427-28 (1998) (arguing that competition between the 
states would produce optimal securities law). 
78. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 1-39 (1991) (describing corporation as "nexus of contracts" between 
shareholders, creditors, and management); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling 
Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1620 
(1989) (characterizing corporation as a relational contract). 
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bear a burden of showing that competition between the states 
will result in a race to the bottom where rules governing 
franchisor opportunism are involved. No one, it should be 
noted, has attempted to make such a showing.79 
One could imagine how such a race might take place. Certain 
states might decide to become "franchisor havens," adopting 
legal regimes that maximize the profitability of franchisor 
opportunism. Franchisors, in turn, might move their 
headquarters to such states, and insert in the governing 
franchise contract a clause choosing the haven's law.so To stem 
the exit of franchisors, other states might respond, adopting 
regimes that are equally hostile to franchisees. Indeed, even if 
such states did not respond, a few haven states might still 
succeed in imposing their law on the rest of the country, so 
long as franchisors moved their headquarters there. Indeed, if 
particular institutional frameworks can facilitate franchisor 
opportunism, franchisees are best characterized as third-party 
victims, unable to protect themselves from the effects of 
jurisdictional competition.sl If so, then states will not 
internalize the full effects of the institutional frameworks they 
generate and may be tempted to pursue a strategy of exploiting 
out-of-state franchisees. 
Several arguments, however, suggest that competition 
among the states will not result in a race to the bottom with 
respect to the institutional framework governing the franchise 
79. Some scholars have recognized that franchisor opportunism may give rise to 
liability under various state law doctrines. See Grimes, Franchisors and Market Power, 
supra note 6, at 140 n.131; Burns, supra note 12, at 617-30 (surveying trends in judicial 
review of fairness in franchisor-frachisee transactions). These scholars have not, 
however, argued that competition between the states to provide such remedies will be 
beset by market failure. See Grimes, Franchisors and Market Power, supra note 6, at 140 
n.131 (stating only that many state law remedies have "proved unsatisfactory to 
franchisees"). 
80. See Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 756 F. Supp. 543, 545 (S.D. Fla. 1991} (enforcing 
clause that adopted Florida law despite plaintiff's argument that "most of the 
transactions between [plaintiff] and Burger King have taken place in Massachusetts"); 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985) (finding that Michigan 
franchisee had sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to confer jurisdiction on 
Florida courts where franchisor was headquartered in Florida and franchise contract 
provided that Florida law would govern the transaction). 
81. Cf. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability 
for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1921-22 (1991) (arguing that allowing the 
incorporating state to choose rules governing shareholder liability to tort victims will 
produce a race to the bottom). 
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relationship.s2 As an initial matter, any "race to the bottom" 
story depends upon certain empirical assumptions about the 
sophistication-or lack thereof- of franchisees. If franchisees 
are sophisticated, they will read their contracts and determine 
which law governs the agreement.83 As a result, choice of law 
clauses will be priced, and franchisors that choose the law of a 
franchisor haven will suffer accordingly.84 Indeed, few things 
would signal more overtly that a franchisor intends to embark 
on a course of opportunism than the adoption of the law of a 
haven state.ss 
In the real world some franchisees- maybe even a 
majority-might be unsophisticated, at least as the term is used 
here. One might seize on this realization and conclude that 
franchisee exit will not constrain franchisors and thus will not 
thwart a state's pursuit of a race to the bottom strategy. Such a 
conclusion, however, would be unduly hasty. Markets may 
function effectively-that is, approximate the result that would 
occur absent transaction costs-even if some or even most of 
the participants are unsophisticated.86 A franchisor that 
adopted the law of a haven state would forgo all of the 
revenue-and expertise-associated with potential sales to 
82. Professors Kobayashi and Ribstein address the separate but related question of 
whether states will attempt to export costs by adopting legal regimes that promote 
franchisee opportunism at the expense of out-of-state franchisors. See Bruce H. 
Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Contract and Jurisdictional Freedom, in THE FALL AND 
RisE OF FREEDOM OF CoNTRAcr 339-47 (Francis H. Buckley ed. 1999). According to 
these authors, franchisors can use choice of law clauses to escape "oppressive" regimes 
that unduly benefit franchisees. See id. at 342. They do recognize the possibility that a 
state may attempt to "become a haven for miscreants," and that franchisors may write 
contracts "that choose a 'proprietary' jurisdiction whose laws are not subject to a 
significant political constraint." !d. at 346. But, they assert that "these special cases 
should be handled by the law of fraud or by specific regulation." !d. The sort of race to 
the bottom described here, however, does not involve fraud, but instead simply 
enforcement of choice of law clauses "as written." Moreover, the assertion that states 
can defeat such opportunism by "specific regulation" seems to beg the question 
whether states would adopt such regulation in light of the threat of franchisor exit. 
83. For an argument that franchisees will read and understand such agreements, see 
Larry Ribstein, Choosing Law By Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245,257 (1993) ("[I]n long-term 
contracts such as franchises and distributorships, the price is set in each case by 
negotiations among sophisticated and knowledgeable parties who have the ability and 
incentive to read the contract carefully or hire an attorney to do so."). 
84. See id.; Winter, supra note 77, at 275-76. 
85. See Ribstein, Choosing Law, supra note 83, at 257 ("Indeed, suspicious negotiators 
may assume the worst from the designation of a particular state's law and 
overdiscount for the clause."). 
86. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect 
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 637-39 (1979). 
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sophisticated franchisees, and this loss might outweigh any 
potential gains from opportunism. 87 
At first glance, the suggestion that a substantial portion of 
franchisees will read and price their choice of law clauses may 
seem implausible. After all, this essay previously conceded, for 
the sake of argument, that exit by franchisees may not be 
sufficient to ensure optimal contractual terms.ss It is one thing, 
however, for a franchisee to read an entire contract, seeking 
clarification of or haggling over individual terms. It is much 
simpler for a franchisee to locate the choice of law clause and 
thus determine whether the contract is governed by the law of 
a haven state. If some states did attempt to pursue a haven 
strategy, choice of law clauses might take on some of the 
attributes of brand names, signaling to potential franchisees the 
trustworthiness of a franchisor. 
Here again, the nature of the competition between states for 
corporate charters may provide an analogy. Very few investors 
read corporate charters; even fewer are familiar with the details 
of Delaware Corporate Law. Nevertheless, economic studies 
demonstrate that the price of a firm's securities does reflect the 
law of the state of incorporation. More precisely, firms that 
incorporate in investor-friendly states see their shares rise in 
87. See id. at 637-39, 649-51. A franchisor could avoid the loss of sophisticated 
franchisees by discriminating between sophisticated and unsophisticated franchisees, 
that is, agreeing that sophisticated franchisees would be governed by law other than 
that produced by the haven state. See Goldberg, supra note 76, at 485 (arguing that 
proponent of form contract can "contract term discriminate" and thus perpetuate 
lemons equilibrium in contract terms). The execution of such a scheme, however, 
would face two significant hurdles. First, franchisors would have to distinguish 
franchisees that will read and understand their contracts from those that will not. 
Simply offering all franchisees contracts with haven state law and then negotiating 
with those who object may not be an effective strategy, as sophisticated franchisees will 
realize that such a strategy is occurring and thus lose trust in the franchisor. Second, 
franchisors and sophisticated franchisees would have to develop some basis for 
adopting law different from that of the haven state. These parties could always adopt 
the law of the sophisticated franchisee's domicile, relegating unsophisticated 
franchisees in that jurisdiction to the law of the haven state. However, if this (non-
haven) jurisdiction has adopted an approach similar to section 211, the clauses 
choosing haven law will likely not be enforceable, as the contracts in question will no 
longer be "standard." See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(2) ("Such a 
writing is interpreted whenever reasonable as treating alike all those similarly situated, 
without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms of the 
writing."); id. at cmt. b. ("[Purchasers) trust to the good faith of the party using the 
form and to the tacit representation that like terms are being accepted regularly by 
others similarly situated."). Indeed, if a franchisor represented that a contract was 
"standard" when it was not, fraud may vitiate the agreement. 
88. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. 
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price, while those that incorporate in states that are hostile to 
investors see their shares fall.s9 Similarly, unduly onerous 
choice of law clauses in franchise contracts may be priced even 
if some franchisees are not sophisticated. 
Let us assume for a moment that franchisees cannot protect 
themselves from a race to the bottom and that transaction costs 
are such that choice of law clauses will not be priced. Even if 
this is the case, other considerations suggest that no race to the 
bottom will occur. To begin with, a state can only pursue a 
"franchisor haven" strategy with the cooperation, actual or 
implicit, of other states. Assume, for instance, that Florida were 
to adopt an opportunism-friendly legal regime. Other states 
could respond by attempting to replicate Florida's rules, to 
stem the flow of franchisor headquarters located in their states; 
some might do so. But what about those states that have no 
franchisor headquarters and no meaningful prospect of 
attracting them?90 These states, it seems, will face pressure to 
adopt institutional frameworks that favor franchisees. Some of 
this pressure will be political in nature-franchisees will agitate 
for legal reform and the appointment of sympathetic judges.91 
Other pressure will be market-based, as sophisticated 
franchisees may exit a jurisdiction that adopts a framework that 
facilitates opportunism. Political and market pressures will not 
always point in the same direction. Political pressure by 
incumbent franchisees may generate rules that are designed to 
promote franchisee opportunism.92 Market pressure by those 
who are not yet franchisees, on the other hand, will generate 
rules that enhance the value of franchise opportunities 
generally. Still, both types of pressure will militate against the 
89. See ROMANO, GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW, supra note 77, at 14-24, 67· 
68. 
90. These states, for instance, may have high taxes or inhospitable regulatory 
environments. Moreover, those states that move first to become franchisor havens may 
realize advantages that other states cannot overcome. See William J. Carney, The 
Political Economy Of Competition For Corporate Charters, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 307-08 & 
n.16 (describing Delaware's first-mover advantages in the competition for corporate 
charters). 
91. See id. at 309 (arguing that "legislators will be tempted to be more responsive to 
local interest groups, including labor, management, and creditors" in states unable to 
attract the chartering business of foreign enterprises). 
92. See, e.g., Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 82, at 339-41; James A. Brickley & 
Fredrick H. Dark, T/ze Choice of Organizational Form: The Case of Franchising, 18 J, FIN. 
EcoN. 401, 406-07 (1987) (describing free-riding and opportunistic behavior by 
franchisees). 
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generation of rules that facilitate opportunism by franchisors. 
The adoption of a pro-franchisee regime will be futile if 
franchisors can impose other regimes on franchisees by 
contract. Thus, states that produce frameworks friendly to 
franchisees must couple the creation of such regimes with a 
refusal to enforce clauses that opt out of the framework.93 By 
refusing to enforce a franchisor's choice of law, such pro-
franchisee states can attenuate the gains a franchisor might 
realize by moving its headquarters to a haven state.94 Pursuit of 
such a strategy by a sufficient number of states will reduce the 
gains a franchisor might realize by moving its operations to a 
haven state, and thus reduce the possibility that franchisors 
will incur the significant cost of such migration.9s States, in 
turn, will experience diluted incentives to become havens in the 
first place.96 
Those who are familiar with the nature of competition for 
corporate charters may wonder whether franchisee-friendly 
states could really "hold out" over the long run. After all, 
under the so-called "internal affairs doctrine," states generally 
enforce a corporation's choice of law, even with respect to 
issues involving shareholders within the forum state.97 States 
that depart from this rule run the risk of driving businesses that 
are incorporated elsewhere out of the state.9s Ultimately, one 
might think, competition among the states might lead "hold 
out" states to abandon their positions and enforce franchisors' 
choice of law clauses, lest a franchisor withdraw its system 
from the state. 
There is, however, an important difference between 
93. See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 82, at 342-43 (reporting that several states 
have passed statutes explicitly voiding contractual choice of law clauses that attempt to 
circumvent application of a state's franchise statute to an in-state franchisee). 
94. See Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate Internal Affairs, 
48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 179-80 (1985) (explaining that states can "reduce the 
appeal of Delaware incorporation by creating the possibility that [their] corporation 
law will supplant the law of Delaware"). 
95. Cf. Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 
365, 375-76 (1992) (arguing that propensity of some states to impose domestic corporate 
law on firms incorporated elsewhere will attenuate the incentives of firms to 
reincorporate in other states). 
96. Cf. id. at 376 (noting that "the competition for out-of-state charters will be 
substantially impeded" if states apply their own law to firms incorporated in other 
states). 
97. DeMott, supra note 94, at 163-64. 
98. See Carney, supra note 90, at 312. 
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corporations and franchise systems that suggests that "hold 
out" states will not readily decide to enforce franchisor choice 
of law decisions. Where a state substitutes its own corporate 
law for that of the incorporating state in a derivative action, for 
instance, it necessarily affects the relationship between the 
firm's management and all of its shareholders.99 By seeking to 
impose burdensome rules on an entire firm, states might drive 
the business out of the state in question.1oo On the other hand, a 
state may limit the effects of its franchising regulation by 
refusing to apply its law to franchisees that operate in other 
states.1o1 Such regulation places a far less onerous burden on 
franchisors than would a decision by one state to apply its law 
to a Delaware corporation.l02 As a result, failure to enforce a 
franchisor's choice of law is not likely to lead the franchisor to 
remove the franchise system from the jurisdiction. Pro-
franchisee states may credibly "hold out" against attempts to 
construct franchisor havens. 
The pursuit of a "hold out" strategy by some states will 
attenuate whatever incentives a state may have to pursue a 
haven strategy. Moreover, in deciding whether to pursue such 
a strategy, a state would have to weigh its benefits against at 
least two distinct costs. First, if a state adopts an institutional 
framework that produces a lemons equilibrium in the terms 
contained in franchise contracts involving out-of-state 
franchisees, this framework will presumably produce lemons 
equilibria in contracts-both franchise and non-franchise-
between the state's own citizens. Second, a state that adopts 
such a system will render its own citizens vulnerable to 
opportunism by trading partners in other states. Foreign firms, 
perhaps located in states that do not have frameworks 
99. A state that chooses to substitute its law for that of the incorporating state can 
only do so at the behest of a domestic shareholder. Still, this shareholder could bring a 
derivative action on behalf of the corporation as a whole, and recover damages 
(payable to the corporation) accordingly. 
100. See Carney, supra note 90, at 312 
101. See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 82, at 342-44 (arguing that states can retain 
franchisor headquarters by limiting the application of pro-franchisee law to its own 
citizens). 
102. Moreover, franchisors can minimize the extent of this burden by terminating 
their franchisees and integrating forward in the state in question, thus avoiding 
altogether any state regulation of the franchising relationship by contract law or 
otherwise. Such integration may produce inefficiencies, unless the previous level of 
independent outlets was driven by a franchisor's pursuit of an opportunism strategy. 
Still, these inefficiencies may be less costly to the franchisor than exiting altogether. 
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conducive to opportunism, could adopt contracts that choose 
the haven state's law and pursue a strategy of opportunism to 
the detriment of the haven state's citizens. 
Thus, unless a state could adopt an institutional framework 
that discriminated between cases involving in-state franchisors 
and all others, pursuit of a franchisor haven strategy would 
produce negative consequences for a state's own citizens.l03 
These consequences, in turn, would even further attenuate the 
net benefits to be realized by such a strategy, and may even 
make such a strategy unprofitable. Thus, the possibility that 
competition among the states will lead states to pursue a 
franchisor haven strategy. seems quite remote. The more likely 
result of such competition, it seems, would be a dual 
equilibrium, in which some states adopt statutes specific to the 
franchise industry that facilitate opportunism by franchisees,104 
while other states adopt regimes that minimize the possibility 
of opportunism. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The case for Sherman Act regulation of franchisor 
opportunism depends upon the presence of transaction costs. 
These costs do not exist in a vacuum but are instead a function 
of the institutional framework, a framework constructed by, 
among other things, rules of contract law. Competition 
between the states and not a federal monopoly should produce 
this framework. 
103. Cf. Richard Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. 
REv. 1717, 1735 (1982) (noting that states will be reluctant to adopt inefficient common 
law rules merely because they subsidize special interests). 
104. Limiting the reach of such statutes to the franchising context would be a 
method of discriminating between the out-of-state franchisors burdened by the 
statutes, on the one hand, and the rest of the states' citizens, on the other. 
